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Abstract
We argue that socializing is an important economic activity because it is vital to
our well being, and that an important input into the activity of socializing is the
set of experiences that is shared by the participants. Clearly, a person’s experiences
are generated, in part, by standard economic choices, and therefore the set of shared
experiences in any social encounter is driven by the prior economic choices of individual
participants. One implication is that these prior choices are not purely private since
the utility that individual participants derive from a social encounter is linked to them.
Our model of this link provides an explanation of a number of interesting phenomena,
including certain sorts of conformity, the domination of one culture by another, and
the existence of superstars.
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11. Introduction
We human beings spend a signi…cant portion of our time socializing with other human beings.
Rarely do we attend movies or concerts or ball games or eat a meal by ourselves; we tend to
ski and hike and canoe, and in general to recreate, in groups; many of us spend half an hour
or more per day socializing via e-mail or on the telephone; most of us spend a signi…cant
portion of our waking hours in conversation; we sometimes strike up conversations with total
strangers; our dreams are …lled with imagined conversation.
In this paper, we argue that socializing is important to our well being, and is therefore an
important economic activity, and that it is tightly linked to a set of familiar economic choices
that economists usually regard as purely private. This link, of course, means that these
choices are not private. Our model of the link that connects socializing to standard economic
choices allows us to explain a number of puzzling phenomena, including the domination of
one culture by another, the existence of superstars, and certain sorts of conformity such as
fads and fetishism.
The fact that social deprivation is a widespread and very e¤ective form of punishment
(for example, solitary con…nement, shunning and banishment) suggests that socializing with
others is an important source of utility. The march of urbanization over the centuries has
certainly enhanced the opportunities for socializing, and may have been driven at least in
part by the desire to socialize. More direct evidence regarding the relationship between
social interaction and well-being comes from the health sciences. In epidemiology, public
health, and gerontology, many scholars have concluded that social interaction is an important
determinant of health, and at least one researcher sees social interaction as perhaps the most
important determinant of health: “While still largely overlooked in epidemiologic thinking,
social system in‡uences ... may account for as much (if not more) of the variation in health
2and/or illness statics as do environmental in‡uences, or the attributes and life-styles of
individuals.” (McKinlay, 1995, p. 2).1
We take it as given that social activities and encounters are important productive activ-
ities in that they contribute to our well-being. When we conceive of a social encounter as a
form of production, we are immediately led to ask: what are the relevant inputs? Time spent
by the participants is, of course, one important input. In addition, the set of experiences
that participants share is, we argue, equally important, and shared experiences are at the
core of the theory developed in this paper.
One way to begin to get some notion of the importance of shared experiences in social
encounters is to think about typical topics of conversation. When we encounter complete
strangers, we often talk about the weather, national and world news, and major sporting
and cultural events, because we are likely to have these types of experiences in common
with total strangers. When we encounter people in lines of work similar to our own, we also
talk about the weather, news, and sports, and in addition we often “talk shop”, because
it draws on another important stock of shared experience. When we encounter friends and
relatives, one important topic of conversation is news regarding other friends and relatives
not present, and again we are drawing on a set of common experiences. Interestingly, when
the conversation turns to someone we do not personally know, we almost immediately lose
interest, because we have no shared experiences on which to draw.
We get more indirect evidence on the importance of shared experiences by looking at
expatriates. Finding themselves in unfamiliar circumstances where the set of experiences
they share with the indigenous population is very limited, expatriates often come together
1 See Lomas (1998) for a review of the evidence and the implications for health policy. Berkman and Syme
(1979) is one of the pioneering studies. Bosworth and Schaie (1997) is representative of the recent literature
in gerontology and Antonucci, Fuhrer, and Dratigues (1997) of the recent literature on the relationship
between mental health and social interaction.
3in their own distinct communities, which allows them to draw and build upon the set of
shared experiences they bring with them from another culture. In contrast, the children of
expatriates, who lack the set of shared experiences that bind their parents together, tend
to blend into the indigenous culture. By the same token, when we …nd ourselves in other
cultures for extended periods of time, we tend to immerse ourselves in newspapers, television
and history in a conscious attempt to augment the stock of experiences we share with the
people we meet in the new culture.
We also take it as given that the utility of any social encounter for any individual depends
on the set of experiences that the individual has in common with other participants. An
individual’s stock of experiences is generated by a series of economic decisions: by the movies
and TV programs seen, by the ball games attended, by the books, magazines and newspapers
read, by the leisure and work activities pursued, in short, by a huge set of economic decisions.
If we take seriously the notion that shared experiences are an important input into an
important utility-generating activity, socializing, then we see that the rational choice of
consumption activities like those listed above cannot be made without due consideration of
the implications for the set of shared experiences in future social encounters. There is then
a link, possibly a strong one, connecting social activity with what economists usually think
of as private consumption decisions. It is this link that we motivate, model and explore in
this paper.2
2 In The Winner-Take-All Society, Frank and Cook (1995) clearly see this link when, in their discussion on
page 191-192 of the forces driving the winner-take-all result in cultural industries, they observe the following:
“Books, movies, sporting events, and television programs are often entertaining in their own right, but most
people also enjoy discussing them with friends.”
In Television Culture, the communications theorist John Fiske (1987) uses a framework that is in some
respects similar to ours. He distinguishes both a cultural economy and what he calls a …nancial economy.
Goods and services are produced in the …nancial economy. The cultural economy uses certain products of
the …nancial economy, cultural commodities like television programs and movies, as inputs into a production
process that involves social interactions among audiences for these cultural commodities. “So much critical
and theoretical attention has been devoted to the mass media in a mass society that we have tended to
ignore the fact that our urbanized, institutionalized society facilitates oral communication at least as well
4When this perspective is taken, every individual’s decisions with respect to consumption
and social activities are intertwined with those of other people. In a full analysis, individuals
would choose their own consumption bundles, and to the extent possible, the set of people
with whom they socialize, and the frequency of interaction. However, in many situations
both the social encounters we have and the identities of the people we meet and interact with
are beyond our control. For example, when we choose to take a particular job, we get a set
of unpredictable social encounters with a set of largely unknown people along with the job.
Similarly, except for our immediate companions, the identities of the people we encounter
when we go skiing, or go to a ball game, or give a seminar, are largely unknown.
In this paper, we model some linked economic choices of a group of people that we
might loosely call a society. We suppose that the social encounters among these people are
random events with uniform probabilities and so focus on the unpredictable social encounters
discussed above. In this framework, the consumption decisions of individuals are clearly
interdependent because they jointly determine the set of shared experiences and hence the
utility from the random encounters. But, in our model, the set of social encounters does not
respond to the consumption decisions of individuals; there is no feedback from consumption
decisions to the social encounters that occur. We think this framework, with its emphasis
on random social interaction, is appropriate for the study of phenomena related to mass,
popular culture.
Herd behavior is the core phenomenon in our theory, and there are at least four bodies
as it does mass communication. We may have concentrated much of our leisure and entertainment into the
home ..., but we attend large schools and universities, many of us work in large organizations, and most of us
belong to or attend some sort of club or social organization. And we live in neighborhoods or communities.
And in all of these social organizations we talk. Much of this talk is about the mass media and its cultural
commodities and much of it is performing a similar cultural function to those commodities – that is, it
is representing aspects of our social experience in such a way as to make that experience meaningful and
pleasurable to us. These meanings, these pleasures are instrumental in constructing social relations and thus
our sense of social identity.” Fiske (1987, pp 77-78).
5of literature where this phenomenon arises. It arises in the social norm literature under the
name of conformity, where the behavior is driven either by punishment mechanisms (real
or imagined) triggered by a deviation from the norm (see Akerlof (1976) and Bernheim
(1994)), or by an innate desire to conform (see Akerlof (1980, 1997) and Jones (1984)).
While this strand of the literature helps to explain community standards and norms like
honesty, industry, and self-reliance, in our view it does not explain conformity in television
viewing habits, in the sports we follow, in the …ction we read or in the movies we watch. For
these kinds of activities, we argue that our approach, with its emphasis on social rewards as
opposed to punishments, is more appropriate.
Herd behavior also arises in the literature on informational cascades (see especially
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992, 1998)), where it is used to explain fads, among
other things. In this literature, herd behavior arises in an environment of identical prefer-
ences with sequential choice and imperfect observability of quality. Our environment is one
with heterogeneous preferences, and we generate herd behavior with simultaneous choice
and perfect observability of quality. However, our model can be adapted to environments
with sequential choice with similar results.
Herd behavior arises in the literature initiated by Leibenstein’s (1950) famous article on
bandwagon, snob and Veblen e¤ects. Corneo and Jeanne (1997) is an interesting recent
contribution. The de…ning feature of this literature is the fact that aggregate behavior
appears as an argument in individual utility functions (see Schelling (1971), Granovetter
(1978), Granovetter and Soong (1983, 1986), Basu (1987), and Bloomquist (1993), Church
and King (1993)). Our model shares this feature, and proposes a novel theoretical basis for
it—the utility generated in social encounters.
Closely related to the literature on bandwagon e¤ects is the literature on network exter-
6nalities (see Katz and Shapiro (1994) for an overview), and at a technical level, our analysis
is an application or adaptation of these ideas. In particular, our model is quite similar to
models of communication networks. Rohlfs (1974) is one of the earliest articles on exter-
nalities in communication networks. Church and King (1993), which deals with the issue
of a common language in a society in which initially everyone speaks one of two languages,
is of particular interest since a common language is perhaps the most important shared
experience. Becker (1991), Grilo, Shy, and Thisse (1998), and Karni and Levin (1994) are
concerned with the pricing strategies of …rms that sell goods that are subject to externalities
of the sort that arise in our model.
While our basic model is similar to others found in the network externality literature,
we propose a novel and, we believe, important theoretical basis for the externality—it arises
from the fact that shared experiences are a signi…cant input in the production of socializing.
More importantly, building on the properties of equilibrium in this sort of model, we o¤er
a uni…ed explanation of a range of phenomena related to mass culture, including cultural
imperialism, the existence of superstars, fads and cultural fetishism, and suggest extensions
in several other directions.
2. The Model
Our model encompasses a series of discrete choice problems, but since there is no link
between them, we proceed by examining a typical problem. Each individual …rst chooses
one consumption experience from a set of consumption experiences; subsequently, individuals
have a series of pairwise social encounters. Consumption experiences have a direct private
value to individuals, and an indirect or derived potential social value that is realized (in
part, or in whole) in their subsequent social encounters. Social encounters are random
7events with uniform probabilities across individuals, so that the probability that any one
individual encounters any other individual in the population is the same for all individuals.
To capture the underlying hypothesis that shared experiences enhance social encounters, we
assume that in any encounter, the realized social value of participant j is larger if the other
participant chose the same consumption experience that participant j chose than it is if the
other participant chose a di¤erent consumption experience.
There are M socially linked consumption experiences denoted by Ei, i = 1;:::;M, and
one asocial consumption experience, denoted by E0. We denote the private value of Ei to
an individual, net of any out-of-pocket costs, by µi. We normalize private values by setting
µ0 = 0. We impose no a priori restrictions on µi for i > 0—they may be positive, negative,
or zero.
Each individual has a total of T social encounters, and gains an increment s > 0 of utility
from every encounter in which the two participants share the same consumption experience.
Letting Ni (0 · Ni · 1) denote the proportion of the population that chooses Ei, the
expected utility of Ei, denoted by Vi, is given by:
V0 = 0 (1)
Vi = µi + s
T X
j=1
Ni i = 1;:::;M
De…ning S = sT, this can be rewritten as
Vi = µi + SNi i = 1;:::;M
Ek is a solution to the individual’s choice problem if and only if Vk ¸ Vi for all i 6= k.
We assume a continuum of individuals to ensure that Ni is independent of the choice
made by any one individual. Private consumption values, µ = [µ1;:::;µM] , di¤er across
8individuals, and are distributed across the population according to some probability density
function, f(µ) = f(µ1;:::;µM). Because the comparative static experiments that are of most
interest deal with the e¤ect of potential derived social value on equilibrium choices, we
assume that S is common to all individuals.
The exogenous elements of this discrete choice problem are S and f, and the endogenous
variables of interest are the aggregate choices N = [N1;:::;NM]. Although there are M + 1





Asterisks denote equilibrium, so N¤ = [N¤
1;:::;N¤
M] are the equilibrium proportions for con-
sumption experiences E1;:::;EM.
We have in mind many discrete choice problems of this sort. We get one such problem if
we focus on the choice of a TV program in some time slot, another if we focus on choice of
a sporting activity, and yet another if we focus on choice of a long distance phone company.
Di¤erent discrete choice problems have di¤erent, non-overlapping, sets of consumption expe-
riences, di¤erent probability density functions, and most importantly, di¤erent values of S.
The value of S for the problem in which individuals choose a long distance phone company
would seem to be 0, while the value of S for the other choice problems listed above are
positive because TV shows and sporting activities are among the experiences that come up
when we socialize.
De…ne -k(N) as the set of individuals who would prefer Ek, given N, as follows:
-k(N) = fµjVk ¸ Vi 8 i 6= kg k = 1;:::;M (2)
Integrating f over -k(N) we get ´k(N), the proportion of individuals who would prefer Ek











¤); k = 1;:::;M: (4)
Some general results on equilibrium and welfare are easily established. Ignoring for the
moment the potential social value of consumption experiences, notice that ¡µi is the induce-
ment required to cause an individual to voluntarily switch from E0 to Ei (an inducement
that is positive only if µi < 0), and that jµi ¡ µjj is the inducement required to cause the
individual to voluntarily switch from the more preferred to the less preferred of Ei and Ej.
Now de…ne ¢ to be the maximum over all individuals of these inducements. If we assume
that f has …nite support—so that ¢ is …nite—the following general results are easily shown
to be true.
Proposition 1 If S > ¢, there are M stable corner equilibria, and in each of these equi-
libria, one of the socially linked consumption experiences captures the entire market. If S is
su¢ciently large, these are the only stable equilibria of the model. If S is very small relative
to ¢ the equilibrium is unique and stable, and is driven by private consumption values.
De…ning social welfare as the sum of utility over all individuals, the following welfare
proposition is easily established.
Proposition 2 Corner equilibria are locally optimal, and may be globally optimal, but in-
terior equilibria are suboptimal. In particular, for any interior equilibrium, switching an
individual who is on the margin of indi¤erence between two socially linked consumption
experiences from the consumption experience with the smaller market share to the other
consumption experience increases social welfare, and switching an individual who is on the
margin of indi¤erence between the asocial consumption experience, E0, and a socially linked
consumption experience, Ek, from E0 to Ek increases social welfare.
Hence, when S is su¢ciently large, there are multiple equilibria characterized by herd be-
havior. Further, as in any model with positive externalities, an equilibrium may be ine¢cient
10in that too little of the positive externality producing activity—in this case, coordinating on a
single consumption experience—takes place. To shed more light on the model, in subsequent
sections we explore its properties in more restricted environments, with both simulation and
analytical methods.
2.1 Simulation Model
In this section we outline and illustrate a simulation approach, and in subsequent sections use
it to explore a number of questions. There are two socially linked consumption experiences,
E1 and E2, and one asocial consumption experience, E0. Private values µ1 and µ2 are
distributed independently and normally in the population, so that f is just the product
of two normal distributions. We use an adaptive adjustment dynamic to go from initial
conditions, N0 = (N0
1;N0
2), to equilibrium proportions, N¤ = (N¤
1;N¤
2). Our convergence
criterion is j´i(N) ¡ Nij=´i(N) · 0:000001 for all i. If the convergence criterion is not
satis…ed, then each Ni is adjusted by the addition of (´i(N) ¡ Ni)=10. We note that this
sort of technique identi…es only the stable equilibria of the model.
Figures 1 through 4 illustrate comparative statics with respect to the social value pa-
rameter S for a case in which f is symmetric. In all four …gures, private values µ1 and µ2
are distributed independently, with mean zero and standard deviation one, while S takes on
progressively larger values. Each …gure is an attractor space, with N1 and N2 on the two
axes, where the lines depict adaptive dynamic adjustment paths leading to the equilibrium,
denoted in the …gures by a …lled square, from a variety of initial conditions.
In Figure 1, S = 0, and there is a unique, stable equilibrium in which 25% of the
population chooses E0, and the rest of the population splits evenly between E1 and E2.
Since consumption experiences have no derived social value, the welfare optimum coincides
with the equilibrium.
11In Figure 2, S = 1. The partition of the attractor space is similar to that in Figure 1, but
there are some notable di¤erences. In equilibrium, only 17% of the population chooses E0, as
some individuals for whom both µ1 and µ2 are negative are induced by derived social value to
choose E1 or E2. Notice also that the equilibrium paths bend in toward the equilibrium.
Because f is symmetric, there are two welfare optima, indicated by the two empty squares
in the …gure, neither of which coincides with the equilibrium. Welfare is maximized with
89.2% of the population choosing one of the socially linked consumption experiences and
5.8% of the population choosing the other.
In Figure 3, S = 2. Here, there are two equilibria. Depending on whether initial
conditions favored E1 or E2, the …nal equilibrium favors the consumption experience with





1) leading to an equilibrium in which 78.7% of
the population chooses E1 (respectively, E2) and 19.3% chooses E2 (respectively, E1). In
equilibrium, only 2% of the population chooses E0, which means that 23% of the population
are induced to choose a socially linked consumption experience despite the fact that their
private values for these experiences are negative. Welfare is maximized with 99.7% of the
population choosing one of the two socially linked consumption experiences and 0.3% of the
population choosing the other.
In Figure 4, S = 3, and now there are two symmetric equilibria, in which 97.8% of the
population choose one of the socially linked consumption experiences and 2.1% choose the
other, and two symmetric welfare optima, in which almost everyone (99.9%) chooses one of
the two socially linked consumption experiences3 .
Figures 5 through 8 illustrate the comparative statics with respect to S for a situation
3 In the text, we report population proportions in (0.999,1.000) as 99.9% to distinguish them from full
market capture of 100.0%.
12in which f is asymmetric. In these …gures, the mean of the µ1 distribution is 0.25 and the
mean of the µ2 distribution is -0.25, and both standard deviations are 1. In Figure 5, S = 0,
and in equilibrium, 49.8% of the population chooses E1 and 26.1% of the population chooses
E2. Because S = 0, the welfare optimum coincides with the equilibrium. In Figure 6,
S = 1, and in equilibrium, 70.3% of the population chooses E1 and 20.9.% of the population
chooses E2. At the welfare optimum, 94.0% of the population chooses E1 and 5.4% of the
population choosing E2. In Figure 7, S = 2, and in equilibrium, 93.9% of the population
chooses E1 and 5.1% of the population chooses E2. At the welfare optimum, 99.9% of the
population chooses E1. In Figure 8, S = 3, and there are now two equilibria. The …rst
equilibrium has 99.3% of the population choosing E1 and 0.7% of the population choosing
E2 and the second equilibrium has 7.1% of the population choosing E1 and 92.7% of the
population choosing E2. The basins of attraction for these equilibria are asymmetric—the
basin for the …rst equilibrium is much larger than that for the second equilibrium. The
unique welfare optimum has 99.9% of the population choosing consumption experience, E1.
2.2 Analytical Model
The simulation model has a number of attractive features. In particular, it allows for nor-
mally distributed private values. However, for some purposes simulation is not entirely
satisfactory, and to get a …rmer grasp of the model, in this section we adopt assumptions
that generate a simpler model for which closed form analytical solutions are possible.
Assume that, for every individual, either µ1 or µ2 is positive, so that in equilibrium
everyone will choose either E1 or E2; that is, N¤
1 + N¤
2 = 1. De…ning Á = µ2 ¡ µ1, we can
write -1 as a function of just N1:
-1(N1) = f(µ1;µ2)jÁ · S(2N1 ¡ 1)g: (5)
13Any density function f induces a density of Á, which we denote by g(Á), and the associated
cumulative density by G(Á). Then, from (3) and (5), it is apparent that
´1(N1) = G(S (2N1 ¡ 1)): (6)
Since N¤
2 = 1¡N¤






Assume further that g is uniform on support [¡X;Y ]. Notice that the proportion of
individuals for whom µ1 > µ2 is X





From (5), (6), and (8) we see that ´1(N1) is given by
´1(N1) = min[1;max(0;
X + S(2N1 ¡ 1)
X + Y
)]: (9)
Notice that ´1(N1) is piecewise linear in N1(because g is uniform).
In Figure 9, we illustrate the equilibria of the model, supposing that X > Y . Equilibrium
points occur where ´1(N1) intersects the 45± line. Stability is a signi…cant issue in models
like this where there is positive feedback. To distinguish stable equilibria, we use an adaptive
adjustment dynamic: an adjustment dynamic is said to be adaptive if N1 increases when
´1(N1) > N1, and decreases when ´1(N1) < N1. In Figure 9, an equilibrium is stable if the
slope of ´1(N1) at the equilibrium point is less than 1, and unstable if the slope exceeds 1.
When S = 0, ´1(N1) = X=(X + Y ), as indicated by the horizontal line in Figure 9, and the
equilibrium is at e1 where N¤
1 = X=(X + Y ). This equilibrium is unique and stable, and
since X > Y , N¤
1 > 1=2.
As S increases, ´1(N1) pivots in counterclockwise fashion around the …xed point(1=2;X=(X+
Y )), as indicated by the arrows in Figure 9, and this is the key to understanding comparative
14statics with respect to S. When N1 < 1=2, increasing S makes E1 less attractive because
the majority of people are choosing E2, so that ´1(N1) shifts downward. In contrast, when
N1 > 1=2, increasing S makes E1 more attractive because the majority of people are choos-
ing E1, so ´1(N1) shifts upward. Hence, as S increases from 0, the unique stable equilibrium
point, N¤
1 = (X ¡S)=(X +Y ¡2S), travels rightward along the 45± line, for example to e2.
When S > Y , we get the corner equilibrium in which N¤
1 = 1, and so long as S < X, this
corner equilibrium is the unique, stable equilibrium. But, when S = X, we pick up the other
corner equilibrium in which N¤
1 = 0, and when S > X, there are two stable corner equilibria.
In addition, when S > X, there is an unstable equilibrium, N¤
1 = (X¡S)=(X+Y ¡2S). This
case is shown in Figure 9 with the three equilibria denoted e3: These results are summarized
in …rst four lines of Table 1.
Table 1: Equilibria in the Analytical Model
Restrictions Stable Equilibria Unstable Equilibrium Optimum
S < Y=2 < Y < X X¡S
X+Y ¡2S none X¡2S
X+Y ¡4S
Y=2 < S < Y < X X¡S
X+Y ¡2S none 1
Y < S < X 1 none 1
Y < X < S f0;1g X¡S
X+Y ¡2S 1
S < Y=2 Y = X 1=2 none 1=2
Y=2 < S < Y = X 1=2 none f0;1g
Y = X < S f0;1g 1=2 f0;1g
Under an adaptive adjustment dynamic, the unstable equilibrium de…nes the basins of
attraction for the two stable equilibria. Speci…cally, given that S > X, if initial conditions
are such that N1 > (X ¡S)=(X +Y ¡2S), then an adaptive adjustment dynamic picks the
15N¤
1 = 1 stable equilibrium, while if N1 < (X ¡ S)=(X + Y ¡ 2S), an adaptive adjustment
dynamic picks the N¤
1 = 0 stable equilibrium. Notice that, as S increases without bound,
(X ¡ S)=(X + Y ¡ 2S) approaches 1=2, and the basins of attraction approach [0;1=2) and
(1=2;1]. Consequently, when S is very large there are two stable corner equilibria that are,
in some sense, equally likely.
To write social welfare as a function of N1, we must …rst choose the N1 individuals who
will be assigned to E1. There are N1 individuals for whom Á is in the interval [¡X;N1(X +
Y ) ¡X], and these are the N1 individuals who have the strongest preference for E1 relative
to E2. If we assign these individuals to E1 and the remaining individuals to E2, we can derive
social welfare as a function of N1, up to a constant K that is determined by the underlying
density function f(µ1;µ2) that induces the uniform g(Á). The welfare function, W(N1), is
W(N1) = K +
Y 2 ¡ (N1(X + Y ) ¡ X)2
2(X + Y )
+ S[(N1)
2 + (1 ¡ N1)
2] (10)
W(N1) is concave in N1 if X +Y > 4S, and convex in N1 if X +Y < 4S. Assuming that
X > Y , welfare is maximized at f N1 = (X ¡ 2S)=(X + Y ¡ 4S) if S < Y=2, and at f N1 = 1
if S > Y=2. Notice that when Y < S < X, the equilibrium and the optimum are coincident
(N¤
1 = f N1 = 1). But, when S < Y , N¤
1 < f N1, and when S > X, one of the stable equilibria
(N¤
1 = 1) is optimal and the other (N¤
1 = 0) is not.
When there is an interior stable equilibrium, the divergence of the equilibrium from the
optimum is readily understood. The equilibrium is determined by the condition that the
marginal individual be indi¤erent between E2 and E1. Now imagine an exercise in which
the marginal individual switches from E2 to E1. This switch has no impact on the utility
of the marginal individual, but it a¤ects the utility of everyone else; it imposes a negative
externality on the group of people who prefer E2, and a positive externality on the group of
people who prefer E1. From Equation (10), it is apparent that the sizes of the externalities
16are determined by sizes of the groups, and since N¤
1 > N¤
2, the positive externality dominates
the negative externality. Hence, 1=2 < N¤
1 < f N1: More generally, in any case where there
is an interior equilibrium in which N¤
1 6= 1=2, the optimum is more asymmetric than the
equilibrium.
When Y = X, the comparative statics with respect to S are somewhat di¤erent. As
regards equilibrium points, when S < X(= Y ), there is a unique and symmetric stable
equilibrium, N¤
1 = 1=2, and when S > X, there are two stable corner equilibria, N¤
1 = f0;1g,
and an unstable interior equilibrium. As regards optimal points, when S < X=2(= Y=2),
there is a unique and symmetric optimum, f N1 = 1=2, and when S > X=2, there are two
corner optima, f N1 = f0;1g. These results are summarized in last three lines of Table 1.
3. Cultural Imperialism
Traditional explanations for state subsidies to the arts focus on externalities and resulting
market failure. Recent work (Zimmer and Toepler, 1999) has criticized this approach for its
failure to explain the signi…cant variation in subsidies across countries. Throsby (1994, p.
21) reports that whereas public expenditure on the arts is only $3 per capita in the USA,
it is $16 per capita in the UK, $28 per capita in Canada and $45 per capita in Sweden.
Although the Canadian population is only a tenth of the U.S. population, Canada spends
almost as much as the U.S. does in this area. The application of our model presented below
responds to the challenge posed by Zimmer and Toepler, and suggests a reason that small
countries such as Canada and Sweden spend more on the arts and cultural preservation
than large countries like the UK and USA. First, it suggests that the smaller a country is
the more prone it is to foreign cultural in‡uences. Second, it suggests that a country may
have to worry about the possibility that its culture may be discontinuously swamped by the
17in‡uence of a larger culture with which it interacts. If we suppose that countries desire to
maintain their own cultural identities, both of these dictate larger expenditures in smaller
countries. Finally, our model suggests that the welfare implications of this sort of cultural
imperialism, and the cultural protectionism that it engenders, are far from straight forward,
and it may very well be the case that social welfare in small countries is decreased by their
e¤orts to support their cultures.
3.1 Simulation Results
To get some insight into the domination of a small culture by a large culture, we adapted our
simulation approach to a situation in which two countries, a large one and a small one, exist
side-by-side, with the same two consumption experiences to choose from, but with di¤erent
distributions of private values in each country. In country A, which has a population of 300
million, most people privately prefer E1, while in country B, which has a population of 30
million, most people privately prefer E2. Speci…cally, in country A the means of the µ1 and
µ2 distributions are 0.25 and -0.25, respectively, while in country B they are -0.25 and 0.25,
respectively. The standard deviations of all four µ distributions are 1.
We then imagine a scenario in which the frequency of cross-border socializing increases
over time as communication and mobility costs decrease, and we focus on the ways in which
the equilibria in the two countries change as cross-border socializing increases. This scenario
is, of course, intended to mimic the ever increasing levels of cross-cultural interaction over
at least the last century. We use as initial proportions the equilibrium proportions from
equilibria favoring E1 in country A and E2 in country B.
We de…ne a cross-border socializing parameter, C, on the unit interval [0,1] such that
with C = 0, all social encounters occur within countries, and with C = 1, social encounters
are independent of national borders. Speci…cally, residents of either country have a fraction
18C of their social encounters with individuals drawn randomly from the pooled population,
and a fraction 1 ¡ C of their social encounters with individuals drawn randomly from the
population of their own country. Thus, with C = 1, residents of country A have 91%
(or 10/11s) of their social encounters with other residents of country A, while residents of
country B have only 9% (1/11th) of their social encounters with other residents of country
B.
In Figure 10, S = 1, …lled squares denote NA
2 (the number of people who choose E2 in
country A’s equilibrium), and …lled triangles denote NB
2 (the number of people who choose
E2 in country B’s equilibrium). Because S is relatively small, there is just one equilibrium in
each country. We see from the …gure that as C increases, the equilibria in the two countries
are drawn toward each other. The larger is C, the more attractive is E1 for individuals in
country B because a larger portion of their social encounters are with people in country A,
most of whom choose E1; similarly, the larger is C, the more attractive is E2 for individuals
in country A because a larger portion of their social encounters are with people in country
B, most of whom choose E2. But, because the population of country B is much smaller than
that of country A, country B’s equilibrium is much more sensitive to cross border social
encounters than is country A’s equilibrium: with C = 0, NA
2 = :210 and NB
2 = :703, and
with C = 1, NA
2 = :226 and NB
2 = :471.
In the Figure 11, empty squares denote welfare for country A and empty triangles denote
welfare for country B, with each welfare measure scaled so that within-country welfare equals
one when C = 0. Notice that welfare is highest for both countries when C = 0 and that
it declines in C. This is because when C = 0, relatively homogeneous within-country
populations are engaging in social encounters only with other residents of their own county.
However, as C rises, the frequency of social encounters with people who have chosen di¤erent
19consumption experiences rises, which diminishes the realized social value of consumption
experiences.4
Figure 12 shows the simulation with S = 4. Now S is so large that there are two equilibria
in both countries (when C is small, at least). When there are multiple equilibria, for country
B we show the equilibrium in which the majority of people chooses E2, and for country A we
show the equilibrium in which the majority of people choose E1. For C < 0:28, the pattern
is similar to what we saw in Figure 10: as C increases NA
2 moves (imperceptibly) upward
toward NB
2 , while NB
2 moves downward toward NA
2 . But, at C = 0:28, in country B, the
equilibrium in which NB
2 is large simply disappears, and residents of country B ‡ock to E1.
This is a really dramatic form of cultural imperialism: increasing cross-border socializing
abruptly destroys the equilibrium in country B in which most people chooses E2, and further
if we focus only on the evolution of NB
2 when C < 0:28, there is really no warning of the
impending discontinuity – no warning that the culture of the smaller country is about to be
destroyed.
In the Figure 13, empty squares denote welfare for country A and empty triangles denote
welfare for country B, with each welfare measure scaled so that within-country welfare equals
one when C = 0. With large S, the welfare e¤ects are dramatic. Within-country welfare
is highest for each country when C = 0. As C rises from zero, welfare declines slightly
in country A and precipitously in country B. This is because for any given increase in
C, the frequency of social contact with residents of the other country increases slightly for
residents of country A and greatly for residents of country B. At the switch-point of C = 0:28,
welfare in both countries jumps up, as residents of both countries coordinate on the same
consumption activity, E1. In country A, welfare jumps back up to nearly its value with
4 Clearly, our partial equilibrium model does not capture the standard welfare e¤ects associated with de-
creasing costs of mobility, communication, and transportation, most of which are positive. Accordingly, one
should not conclude based on results reported here that C = 0 is optimal in a global sense.
20C = 0. However, in country B, welfare never recovers to its value with C = 0, because
they are coordinating on a consumption experience that is intrinsically inferior given their
preferences.
3.2 Analytical Results
In this section, we adapt the analytical model to the problemof cultural imperialism, focusing
particularly on the discontinuity seen in the simulation results. Assume that in country A,
Á = µ2¡µ1 is uniformly distributed on (¡X;Y ), that in country B, Á is uniformly distributed
on (¡Y;X), that X > Y , that the population of country A is ¸ > 1 times the population of
country B, and that S > X.
Given these assumptions, in isolation (when C = 0), there are two stable corner equilibria
in each country, and the preferred equilibrium in country A is the one in which everybody
chooses E1 (the all choose E1 equilibrium), while the preferred equilibrium in country B
is the all choose E2 equilibrium. Beginning with C = 0 and each country in its preferred
equilibrium, we ask three questions. How large must C be to destroy the initial equilibrium?
What happens when this initial equilibrium is destroyed? Who gains and who loses when
the initial equilibrium is broken?
Letting PIJ denote the proportion of social encounters that residents of country I have
with residents of country J, we …nd that: PAA = (1 + ¸ ¡ C)=(1 + ¸); PAB = C=(1 + ¸);
PBA = ¸C=(1 + ¸); and PBB = (1 + ¸ ¡ ¸C)=(1 + ¸). Given the numbers of people who
choose E1 in countries A and B, NA
1 and NB
1 respectively, the set of individuals in country
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Because S > X, the only stable equilibria are corner equilibria. The situation in which
everyone in country A chooses E1 and everyone in country B chooses E2 is an equilibrium
if and only if ´A
1 (1;0) = 1 and ´B
1 (1;0) = 0. The …rst of these conditions, the condition for
country A, is satis…ed if and only if C · (1+¸)(S ¡Y )=(2S), and the condition for country
B is satis…ed if and only if C · (1 + ¸)(S ¡ Y )=(2¸S). Of course, both are satis…ed when
C = 0, but as C increases, people in both countries …nd that a smaller and smaller proportion
of their social interactions are with people who have the same consumption experience as
themselves, and as a result the initial corner equilibria become progressively less attractive.
However, because country A is the larger country (that is, because ¸ > 1), the condition for
country B is the binding constraint. Hence, when C passes through (1+¸)(S¡Y )=(2¸S) the
initial equilibrium is destroyed, as all residents of country B switch from E2 to E1. So, we
have answered the …rst two questions posed above: as C passes through (1+¸)(S¡Y )=(2¸S)
the initial equilibrium vanishes, producing a new equilibrium in which all individuals in both
22countries choose E1. Notice that the critical value of C at which country B ‡ips from one
corner equilibrium to the other is a decreasing function of ¸ and Y and an increasing function
of S, and that it can be quite small. For example, if ¸ = 10, S = 4 and Y = 2, the all choose
E2 equilibrium in country B vanishes when C = 11=80.
A partial answer to the third question is immediate: social welfare in country A increases
because after the ‡ip, all social interactions are perfectly coordinated – in fact, everyone in
country A is better o¤ after the ‡ip. In country B, the situation is less clear: realized social
value increases in country B for the same reason that it increases in country A, but private
value decreases since, on average, µ2 > µ1 in country B. The increase in realized social value
from better coordination is equal to S¡Y
2 , and the loss in private value from the switch to
E1 is equal to X¡Y
2 . Since S > X, the …rst e¤ect dominates the second, with the result
that when country B ‡ips to the all choose E1 equilibrium, social welfare in country B also
increases.
With S > X, all four of the possible corner equilibria in this two country model are
sometimes possible, depending on the degree of cross-border socializing. For completeness, in
Table 2 we summarizes the possibilities. Notice that KA and KB are constants of integration
whose values are determined by the underlying density functions that induce the two uniform
distributions of Á.
23Table 2: Equilibria of the Two Country Model
General Restriction: S > X
Equilibria Restriction Welfare in A Welfare in B
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The superstar literature is focussed on explaining why some actors, musicians and authors
enjoy immense earnings both in an absolute sense and relative to the incomes of an army
of equally (or almost equally) talented starving artists. For example, over the 15 years from
1980 through 1994, there were 150 top 10 books of …ction. According to People Entertain-
ment Almanac’s list, one person wrote 19 of them, another wrote 18, and the top six authors
wrote 66 (or 44%) of them. The dominant explanations (eg, see Rosen (1981), Adler (1985),
McDonald (1988) and Frank and Cook (1995)) for the existence of superstars stress the sup-
ply side, for example, increasing returns in production driven by large development costs and
insigni…cant costs of reproduction. In contrast, our analysis suggests an exclusively demand
side story.
Our explanation of superstars is straightforward. When S is large, consumers want to
coordinate their choices so as to realize potential social value, but, in any choice situation,
there are multiple equilibria that achieve the desired coordination, and hence an important
coordination problem. We argue that consumers use superstars to solve this coordination
problem. One implication is that when superstars are used in this way, there can be only
24a small number of them since superstar opposite superstar yields no coordination value.
Another implication is that more talented newcomers may be forced to wait a long time
before becoming superstars — witness the examples of Van Gogh, Mozart and Lenny Breau,
all of whom died penniless.
We use a tournament simulation of binary choice to illustrate the emergence of superstars
in a setting where past histories of actors are used to establish initial conditions that enter
an adaptive adjustment dynamic. In these simulations S = 4 and the distribution of private
values is nearly symmetric so that there are almost always two stable equilibria, which for
all practical purposes are corner equilibria in which everyone chooses the same consumption
experience. Since they establish initial conditions, actors’ histories pick the equilibrium that
is attained. In each period, two consumption experiences vie for market share, the standard
deviations of both private value distributions are 1, and the means of the two distributions
are random draws from a normal density function with standard deviation ¾ and mean
0. One of 10 actors (or writers or musicians) is randomly assigned to each consumption
experience, and initial conditions are determined by the sum of the actors’ market shares
in all previous periods. In this environment, an actor’s market share in any period is either
very close to 1 or very close to 0. Naturally, an actor that is not assigned in that period
gets a market share of zero. Letting Hi denote the sum of the market shares of the actor
associated with Ei, the initial value of N1 in any period of the simulation is H1=(H1 + H2).
Table 3 reports results for 7 simulations that di¤er by value of ¾, each of which was run
for 1000 periods. Average market shares of the 10 actors over the last 200 periods of the
simulation are reported in rank order.
25Table 3: Superstars
Rank ¾ = 100 ¾ = 16 ¾ = 4:00 ¾ = 1:00 ¾ = 0:25 ¾ = 0:05 ¾ = 0:000001 reference
1 0.61 0.60 0.64 .66 0.93 1.00 0.95 9/9
2 0.54 0.58 0.58 .63 0.87 0.85 0.93 8/9
3 0.54 0.56 0.53 .62 0.78 0.78 0.72 7/9
4 0.52 0.56 0.52 .52 0.69 0.70 0.66 6/9
5 0.52 0.55 0.49 .51 0.51 0.46 0.62 5/9
6 0.51 0.50 0.47 .50 0.45 0.41 0.27 4/9
7 0.49 0.43 0.46 .47 0.27 0.39 0.25 3/9
8 0.46 0.42 0.44 .43 0.19 0.21 0.18 2/9
9 0.45 0.39 0.44 .42 0.14 0.12 0.03 1/9
10 0.35 0.39 0.42 .15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0/9
The results reported in this table show an interesting interplay between the role of initial
conditions and di¤erences in the inherent quality of consumption experiences in picking
the equilibrium that emerges. When ¾ is large, there is considerable variance in average
quality. Hence the better consumption experience in any period tends to have a very large
basin of attraction, which implies that only rarely do di¤erences in initial conditions pick
the equilibrium in which the inferior one dominates the market. Because initial conditions
are essentially irrelevant when ¾ is large, average market shares of all actors tend toward
0.5. In contrast, when ¾ is small, there is very little variance in the average quality of
consumption experiences. Hence, in most periods there is very little di¤erence in the sizes
of the basins of attraction, which means that initial conditions play a dominant role in
picking the equilibrium that emerges. Accordingly, an actor’s relative success in the …rst few
26periods of the simulation determines the actor’s relative success for the entire simulation.
Necessarily, there are signi…cant di¤erences in relative success in the …rst few periods of any
simulation, which persist throughout the entire simulation. In short, when ¾ is small, we
get superstars – that is, actors who get very large market shares over extended periods of
time, not because they are inherently superior to other actors, but simply because they were
lucky in the …rst few periods of the simulation.
Notice that the explanation of superstars that we are o¤ering is applicable to situations
where there are small di¤erences in the inherent quality of the consumption experiences, and
a large utility from coordinated consumption. We would argue that these conditions prevail
in a variety of entertainment industries, including music, movies, and books.
The last column of Table 3 presents analytical results from a restricted version of this
model. Here, we assume that there are no inherent quality di¤erences between consumption
experiences, and that there is a cyclic, as opposed to random, pairing of actors. Consider,
for example, a model involving just three actors, and cyclic pairings in which: actors 1 and
2 are chosen in periods 1, 4, 7, ...; actors 1 and 3 in periods 2, 5, 8, ...; and actors 2 and
3 in periods 3, 6, 9, ... . As one can readily verify, after the …rst 3 periods, one actor’s
history will have two 1s, another’s will have a 0 and a 1, and another’s will have two 0s.
In all subsequent pairings, the actor who luckily started with two 1’s dominates both of
her opponents, the actor who got one 1 and one 0, dominates one of her opponents and is
dominated by the other, and the actor who unluckily got two 0s is dominated by both of her
opponents. Consequently, average market shares over any number of complete cycles are 1,
1/2, and 0. When there are n actors, average market shares over any number of complete
cycles are 1, 1 ¡ 1=(n ¡ 1), 1 ¡ 2=(n ¡ 1), ..., 0.
It might be argued that all we have done is to add another argument for the existence
27of superstars to an already plausible set of arguments. Our case is strengthened by the
following observation. While superstars dominate mass culture …lms, in another market
for movies, superstars are notable for their absence. The Economist (1999) reports that
in pornography, the studio system—with actors on payroll—has emerged as the dominant
form of organization. We explain this contrast in the following way. Since cultural norms
restrict people from sharing their pornography experiences in social encounters, superstars
are not useful as coordination devices. Rather there is an information problem but not a
coordination problem. What is needed is a producer with a good reputation — just what
has emerged in pornographic movies.
5. Fads and Related Phenomena
Fads refer to herd behavior that is ephemeral. They are common in the market for children’s
toys, where one toy may capture a huge market share, but for a small period of time. Pet
rocks, for example, were a dominant toy for a short time, while cabbage patch dolls were
dominant for a number of years, but eventually faded from the scene. The dominant ex-
planation of fads is informational cascades (see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992,
1998). This explanation requires that consumers have identical preferences over quality,
that they sequentially observe the purchasing decisions but not utility of others, and that
no specialized expertise in quality assessment exists on which consumers may rely. These
conditions are di¢cult to rationalize for the kinds of cultural goods we are concerned with.
Book reviews, movie reviews, television and sporting event previews and restaurant guides
are pervasive. Our experience is that people, especially children, delight in telling everyone
about their cultural experiences often in the hope that others will choose to share them.
Our model, which incorporates heterogeneous preferences, simultaneous choice and perfect
28information, is more appropriate for cultural goods. Further, with the addition of quality
decay, described below, our model generates fads.
We use a tournament framework in which popular consumption experiences survive and
unpopular ones are eliminated and replaced by new consumption experiences drawn ran-
domly from a quality distribution. Both private value decay, and the heavy hand of the
past in determining initial conditions are central to our story. If consumption experiences
are TV shows, decay could arise for a number of reasons: if sitcom writers exploit their best
ideas …rst, then decay is a natural phenomenon; similarly, since most of the real news in
the Clinton/Lewinsky a¤air came out in the …rst few weeks, the informational content of
news broadcasts featuring the a¤air decayed over time; similarly, in TV serials, decay may
be driven by consumers’ boredom with the set of main characters or other elements of the
show’s formula.
In every period two consumption experiences vie for market share. The variances of the
privatevalue distributions for all consumption experiences are equal to one. The means of
these distributions are generated by random draws from a standard normal distribution.
A consumption experience that captures a market share less than 20% is eliminated and
replaced by another, whereas those that have a market share greater than 20% survive. The
private values of all consumers for a surviving consumption experience decay by an absolute
amount D. In each period except the …rst, initial conditions are determined by market
shares in the previous period. When S is large, one consumption experience will survive and
one will be eliminated in each period, and initial conditions in the next period will favor the
surviving consumption experience. Since the extreme market shares associated with large
values of S are the stu¤ of which fads are made, we restrict attention to values of S ¸ 2
that tend to create equilibria with extreme market shares.
29Table 4 summarizes results for 12 simulations distinguished by di¤erent values of the
parameters D and S. Each simulation ran for 1000 periods. A consumption experience is
called successful if it lasted for more than one period—that is, if it captured a market share of
at least 20% in at least one period. The table reports the number of successful consumption
experiences, their mean duration, and the proportion of periods in which the successful
consumption experience had a lower mean private value than the eliminated consumption
experience.
Table 4: Fads
D = 0:00 D = 0:05 D = 0:10
S Nsuccess mean bad prop. Nsuccess mean bad prop. Nsuccess mean bad prop.
2 5 201 0.000 91 14 0.160 145 9 0.137
3 3 334 0.009 49 21 0.091 85 13 0.125
4 1 1000 0.033 31 33 0.229 54 20 0.291
When there is no decay (D = 0:00), there are a small number of successful consumption
experiences for any value of S, and the number of successful consumption experiences dimin-
ishes as S increases. These results are intuitive. With no decay, a consumption experience
with a good private value distribution (one with a high mean) can be dislodged only by one
with a better private value distribution (one with a higher mean), and the better the private
value distribution, the longer on average is the interval of time before it is dislodged. In
addition, the bias in initial conditions favoring surviving consumption experiences increases
in S, so that the average interval of time before a show is dislodged increases in S.
With D > 0 the ephemeral dominance characteristic of fads becomes evident. In addition,
there is a clear and readily understood pattern in the results for D > 0. The larger is D,
the larger is the number of successful consumption experiences, and the smaller is the mean
30number of periods a successful consumption experience survives. The larger is S, the smaller
is the number of successful consumption experiences, and the larger is the mean number of
periods a successful consumption experience survives.
With no decay (D = 0) or with no utility gained from shared experience (S = 0), there
are no fads—high quality consumption experiences dominate forever. Fads are possible if
decay in private values overwhelms the persistence of equilibria caused by a high value of
shared experience. The length of fads thus depends on the interaction of D and S.
There is a sense in which the United States is, and has been for a very long time, a football
culture, while western Europe is, and has been for a very long time, a soccer culture. There
have been numerous attempts to introduce American style professional football in Europe
and to introduce professional soccer in the United States, but success has been limited. We
would argue that the limited success is evidence of a large S and a very small D. There
is old joke that captures the essence of our explanation. Question: Why did God invent
soccer? Answer: So that Englishmen would have something to talk about in the pub. (In
America it might go something like this. Question: Why did God invent football? Answer:
So American men would have something to say on talk radio.) Americans never tire of
watching and talking about football, and because they don’t, soccer will never replace it. If
our explanation is accepted, then the di¤erence between fads like cabbage patch dolls and
mass entertainments like football, both of which are linked to socializing, is just the rate at
which private values decay.
6. Cultural Fetishism
The New York Times (June 20, 1999) recently used the term “cultural fetishism” to describe
the behavior of people who wallow in the minutiae of information available about pop culture.
31A similar puzzle is explored in a 1997 Slate article (Menand, 1997) concerning the extremely
large audience for the re-release of the Star Wars movies, movies that had been available on
videotape for years. Why did people spend so much time and resources on activities in which
the private return must be very small? The paradox is even more evident in television news.
The exhaustive coverage of the O. J. Simpson trial, the death of Princess Diana, and the
Clinton/Lewinsky scandal5 caused many to complain that television news had become too
painful (or uninteresting) to watch. Yet they still watched. We resolve this paradox through
the distinction between the private utility derived from an activity and the utility derived
from improved socializing. In the cases cited above, negligible or even negative private
rewards are more than compensated for by the bene…ts resulting from increased utility from
social encounters.
In our view, cultural fetishism is a situation in which people choose an experience with a
low or even negative private value. When S is large, this is clearly possible. In addition, when
private preferences decay with repeated exposure, there may be a strong path-dependence
at work which pushes us towards doing the things we have done in the past, even if they are
no longer intrinsically rewarding.
Consider a many period simulation in which the equilibrium in the …rst period is as
pictured in Figure 8, with almost the entire population choosing E1. We set S = 3, and the
standard deviations of both distributions to 1. The mean of the µ1 distribution is 0.25 and
the mean of the µ2 distribution is -0.25. Given these µ distributions, on the basis of private
values alone, 60% of the population prefers E1 to E0 while only 40% of the population prefers
E2 to E0. Suppose that, in any subsequent period t, initial conditions are identical to the
5 The extreme nature of the television coverage of this story has been documented by the Center for Media
and Public A¤airs (Media Monitor, 1999). In 1998, U.S. television networks devoted one-seventh of their
news airtime to the Clinton/Lewinsky scandal (1636 stories). Second place went to the stando¤ with Iraq
(642 stories) followed by the Asian economic crisis (227 stories) and the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa
(180 stories).
32equilibrium values in period t ¡ 1. Thus, initial conditions in period 2 have 99.2% of the
population choosing E1. Suppose too that in all subsequent periods, every individual’s µ1
declines.
Table 5 shows results of this simulation when each consumer’s µ1 decreases by 0.1 each
period. When the mean of the µ1 distribution is -.85 or greater, initial conditions are in the
basin of attraction of the equilibrium in which E1 dominates, and from period 7 through
12, this society is in the inferior E1 dominant equilibrium. In the last period in which E1
dominates, 86.5% of the population choose E1, and µ1 is negative for virtually everyone who
chooses E1. The last column of the table reports social welfare in equilibrium.
Table 5: Fetishism
period mean of µ1 N¤
1 N¤
2 welfare
1 0.25 99.2 0.7 3.23
2 0.15 99.0 0.9 3.13
3 0.05 98.8 1.1 3.02
4 -0.05 98.5 1.4 2.91
5 -.15 98.2 1.7 2.80
6 -.25 97.7 2.1 2.69
7 -.35 97.1 2.6 2.58
8 -.45 96.3 3.2 2.46
9 -.55 95.3 4.1 2.34
10 -.65 93.9 5.3 2.20
11 -.75 91.6 7.2 2.05
12 -.85 86.5 11.6 1.84
13 -.95 0.5 99.3 2.73
33When S is large, coordination is important to consumers – above all, they want to
choose the same consumption experience. Unfortunately, if private values for a particular
consumption experience decay with exposure, consumers may nevertheless continue to choose
an experience that is privately no longer attractive, because there is no obvious way to
coordinate the switch to a better experience.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper is built on two hypotheses, and two straightforward implications. The …rst
hypothesis is that socializing is an important economic activity, and the second is that shared
experiences are an important input into the activity of socializing. The …rst implication is
that certain sorts of consumption experiences have, in addition to a private value, a potential
social value. The second implication is that in situations where, for most people, potential
social value is large relative to di¤erences in private values, there are multiple equilibria,
and in all of them we see herd behavior, or conformity. The …rst hypothesis is, we believe,
undeniably true – socializing is important to our well-being. The second is, we think, also
true, because shared experiences play a very visible role in our social interactions. The fact
that we are able to provide a uni…ed explanation of a variety of interesting and disparate
phenomena is perhaps another indication that this line of research is worth exploring.
In this paper, we have focused on the role of shared experiences, because we think they
are important. It is clear, however, that non-shared experiences are also important, and in
some sorts of social encounters these non-shared experiences are at least as important as
shared experiences, for the simple reason that if others have a set of experiences identical to
our own, they have nothing new to o¤er us. Developing this more general theory of the role
of participants’ experiences as inputs into socializing is one interesting line of inquiry.
34In our model, the set of social encounters is exogenous. Clearly, many social encounters
are exogenous, but the most important encounters are undoubtedly endogenous, and this
observation opens up another promising avenue of research. It has been suggested to us6
that this line of inquiry might yield an explanation of the surprising “border e¤ects” that
McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996) have documented. Using a gravity model, McCallum’s
work suggests that the Canada/US border has an e¤ect on trade ‡ows that is equivalent to
a distance of 2500 miles. This is readily understood if business is in part social, and business
people in a country have more in common with other business people in their own country
than they do with those in a foreign country. Hence, if commercial considerations leave a
business person nearly indi¤erent between a foreign deal and a home deal, the higher social
value of the home deal seals it.
This model may also help explain a variety of labor market phenomena, including the
importance of friendship networks in job …nding.7 Jobs are often found by informal contacts
that involve people inside the business where there are vacancies telling their friends about
the vacancies. Our approach may explain why workers inform their friends about vacancies
– because the social encounters they have in the work place will be more rewarding owing to
the fact that their friends share many of their own experiences. Further, …rms may actively
support this strategy since reservation wages, voluntary turnover, and absenteeism will be
lower for workers who anticipate rewarding, on-the-job social encounters.
More generally, this framework may provide an explanation of some forms of discrimina-
tion and segregation in labor markets. Rath (1999) reports that in the Netherlands, native
born construction workers have a lively working culture characterised by “having a rough
tongue, horsing around, bragging about one’s sexual performance, ... pissing in the mortar
6 We acknowledge both George Akerlof and Robert Mansell for these ideas.
7 We acknowledge Lasheng Yuan for this idea.
35[and] making jokes”. He …nds that immigrants in the Netherlands are unable and unwilling
to take on building trades jobs because they do not share the cultural background of Dutch
workers, and thus are unable and unwilling to “piss in the mortar”, that is, engage socially,
with their co-workers.
Finally, we suggest that our model may help to explain the structural features of some
of the industries that produce cultural goods, in particular the newspaper industry. This
industry is notable for its concentration, for the staying power of individual newspapers, and
for a variety of restrictive and costly labor practices. The case of the North Shore News, a
weekly paper that serves Vancouver’s north shore is instructive. Over the years there have
been more than a dozen unsuccessful attempts to enter this market. Our model suggests an
explanation along the following lines. If readers collectively use local newspapers to generate
a stock of shared experiences relevant to their community, then the local newspaper market is
a natural monopoly in both the positive and the normative senses of the term. Accordingly,
to be successful, an entrant must drive the existing paper from the market. And to do so it
must get a substantial foothold in the market right out of the gate; that is, it must somehow
convince a large portion of local readers that a large portion of local readers is going to, or
already has switched to the entrant’s paper. If readers are using the local paper to generate
shared experiences, it is not enough to put a better paper on the market, hoping to build
readership over the long haul. Because it is so di¢cult to drive an established paper from
the market, restrictive labor practices that would induce entry of unconstrained competitors
and/or exit of the established …rm in a market not subject to this sort of network externality,
can survive over the long term in the newspaper industry.
REFERENCES
Adler, M. (1985), ”Stardom and Talent,” American Economic Review, 75, 208-12.
36Akerlof, G. (1976), ”The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful
Tales,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 599-617.
Akerlof, G. (1980), ”A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment May Be One
Consequence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 749-75.
Akerlof, G. (1997), ”Social Distance and Social decisions”, Econometrica, 65, 1005-1027.
Antonucci, T., R. Fuhrer and J. F. Dartigues (1977), ”Social Relations and Depressive
Symptomatology in a Sample of Community-Dwelling French Older Adults,” Psychol-
ogy and Aging, 12, 189-195.
Basu, K. (1987), ”Monopoly, Quality, Uncertainty and ’Status’ Goods,” International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 435-446.
Bernheim, B. D. (1994), ”A Theory of Conformity,” Journal of Political Economy, 102,
841-877.
Becker, G. S. (1991), ”A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social
In‡uences on Price,” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 1109-1116.
Berkman, L and S. Syme (1979), ”Social Networks, Host Resistance, and Mortality:
A Nine-Year Follow-Up Study of Alameda County Residents,” American Journal of
Epidemiology, 109, 186-204.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer and I. Welch (1998), ”Learning from the Behavior
of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades,” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12, 151-170.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer and I. Welch (1992), ”A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Cus-
tom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy,
100, 992-1026.
Bloomquist, N. S. (1993), ”Interdependent Behavior and the E¤ect of Taxes,” Journal
of Public Economics, 51, 211-218.
Bosworth, H. and K. Schaie (1977), ”The Relationship of Social Environment, Social
Networks, and Health Outcomes in the Seattle Longitudinal Study: Two Analytical
Approaches,” Journal of Gerontology, 52B, 197-205.
Church, J. and I. King (1993), ”Bilingualism and Network Externalities”, The Canadian
Journal of Economics, 26, 337-345.
Corneo, G. and O. Jeanne (1997), ”Conspicuous Consumption, Snobbism and Con-
formism”, Journal of Public Economics, 66, 55-71.
Economist, (1999), ”Branded Flesh,” The Economist–FACE VALUE, August 14
- 20 (1999), page 56. www.economist.com/ editorial/ freeforall/ current/ in-
dex_wb2948.html.
Fiske, John (1987), Television Culture: Popular Pleasures and Politics. London and
New York: Methuen and Company Ltd.
37Frank, R. H. and P. J. Cook (1995), The Winner-Tale-All Society. New York : Free
Press.
Jones, S. (1984), The Economics of Conformism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
Gravonovetter, M. (1978), ”Threshold Models of Collective Behavior.” American Jour-
nal of Sociology, 83, 1420-1443.
Gravonovetter, M., and R. Soong (1983), ”Threshold Models of Di¤usion and Collective
Behavior,” Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 9, 165-179.
Gravonovetter, M., and R. Soong (1986), ”Threshold Models of Interpersonal E¤ects
in Consumer Demand,” Journal of Behavior and Organization, 7, 83-99.
Grilo, I., O. Shy, and J. F. Thisse (1998), ”Price Competition when Consumer Behavior
is Characterized by Conformity or Vanity”, discussion paper.
Helliwell, J. (1996), ”Do National Borders Matter for Quebec’s Trade”, Canadian Jour-
nal of Economics, 29, 507-522.
Karni, E. and D. Levin (1994), ”Social Attributes and Strategic Equilibrium,” Journal
of Political Economy, 102, 822-840.
Leibenstein, H. (1950), ”Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen E¤ects in the Theory of Con-
sumer Demand,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 64, 183-207.
Lomas, J. (1998),”Social Capital and Health: Implications for Public Health and Epi-
demiology,” Social Science and Medicine, 47, 1181-1188.
McCallum, J. (1995), ”National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Pattern-
s”, American Economic Review, 85, 615-623.
Media Monitor (1999), Center for Media and Public A¤airs, 8 (January/February
1999).
Menand, L. (1997), ”How Star Wars Changed the World,” Slate (February 11, 1997),
http://www.slate.com/MovieReview2/97-02-11/MovieReview2.asp
MacDonald, Glenn M. (1988), ”The Economics of Rising Stars,” American Economic
Review 78, 155-66.
McKinlay, J. (1995), ”Bringing the Social Sciences Back In: An Essay on the Epidemi-
ological Imagination,” New England Research Institute, Boston.
MOREOVER, ”Culture wars,” The Economist, September 12 - 18 (1998), 97-99.
Panek, R. (1999), ”Seeing the Familiar in Ever new Ways,” New York Times, (June
20, 1999).
Rath, Jan. (1999) ”A Dutch Bargain: The Remarkable Absence of Immigrant Entrepre-
neurs in Construction”, unpublished working paper, Institute for Migration and Ethnic
Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam.
Rosen, S. (1981), ”The Economics of Superstars,” American Economic Review, 71,
845-58.
38Schelling, T. (1971), ”Dynamic Models of Segregation,” Journal of Mathematical Soci-
ology, 1, 143-186.
Throsby, D.(1994), ”The Production and Consumption of the Arts: A View of Cultural
Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature, 32, 1-29.
Zimmer, A. and S. Toepler (1999), ”The Subsidized Muse: Government and the Arts
in Western Europe and the United States,” Journal of Cultural Economics, 23, 33-49.
































































































































































































































































































43e2 ( 1/2,(X+Y)/2 )
e1























































































































































46FOR A CURRENT LIST OF
DISCUSSION PAPERS
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY,
PLEASE CONSULT OUR
WEB. SITE AT
WWW.SFU.CA/ECONOMICS